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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-4002 
___________ 
 
DAVID S. JOHNSON,  
    Appellant 
v. 
 
ALLEGHENY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR  
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:15-cv-00713) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 22, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 14, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 David Johnson appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his civil 
rights action against the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (the “ACCCP”) and 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (the “WDPA”).  
Johnson’s complaint charged each of those courts with having previously misconstrued 
certain of his applications for post-conviction relief, to such a degree that Johnson 
suffered constitutional injury.  He requested approximately $1.5 million in damages.   
 Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Johnson’s complaint was 
screened by the Magistrate Judge.  She recommended that the action be dismissed 
because both the ACCCP and the WDPA are absolutely immune from suits, like 
Johnson’s, seeking monetary relief.  Johnson filed objections, primarily arguing—in 
contradiction of the caption to his complaint—that he had sued particular judges of the 
ACCCP and the WCPA, not the courts themselves.  The District Court overruled 
Johnson’s objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and dismissed 
Johnson’s complaint—without leave to amend—under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) 
(providing that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that 
the action or appeal seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 
relief.”).1  Johnson timely appealed. 
                                              
1  Johnson was incarcerated at the time he filed the complaint below, but was released a 
few months later.  The PLRA applied below notwithstanding Johnson’s post-suit release.  
See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Harris v. City of 
New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010).  We note that, according to his filings in this 
Court, Johnson appears to have been re-incarcerated during the pendency of his appeal.    
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A district court is permitted to 
dismiss an action under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), sua sponte, where it is clear on the face of 
the complaint that the defendant is immune from suit.  See Walker v. Thompson, 288 
F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[a]ppropriate caution in [exercising the 
authority to dismiss under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)] is assured by the requirement that the 
validity of the defense be both apparent from the complaint itself, and unmistakable, so 
that the suit is fairly describable as frivolous.”).  Whether a defendant is entitled to 
absolute immunity is a question of law that requires de novo review.  See Figueroa v. 
Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 On appeal, the WDPA has moved for summary affirmance pursuant to Third 
Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, arguing that the District Court properly dismissed 
Johnson’s suit for the reasons given in the Magistrate Judge’s report.  We may summarily 
affirm the judgment of a district court on motion of a party, or sua sponte.  See id.2  We 
may do so if the appeal presents no substantial question.  Furthermore, we may affirm on 
any ground supported by the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 Insofar as Johnson sued the ACCCP and WDPA for money damages, those 
entities were entitled to immunity from suit.  See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 
(1994); P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 
                                              
2 On August 29, 2016, the Clerk notified the parties that the Court would “consider the 
possibility of summary action as to all appellees.”  All parties were invited to respond to 
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(1993); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Insofar as Johnson instead meant to sue particular judges of those courts based on 
rulings adverse to Johnson, those judges, too, would be immune from suit.  See Mireles v. 
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983).  
Either way, Johnson’s suit was plainly barred on immunity grounds, and the District 
Court thus properly dismissed his complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).  Leave to amend 
would have been futile given the aforementioned immunity defenses.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Therefore, we will grant the 
WDPA’s motion and summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court as to all 
defendant-appellees.  Johnson’s motion “for a speedy response to his appeal” is denied as 
moot.      
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Clerk’s notice; none did within the 21 days allotted. 
